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Reply to Professor Ehrhardt
I was relieved to note that Professor Ehrhardt's critique of my
Comment found more to agree with than to criticize. His major concern
seems to be my failure to explain why I don't feel CSAAS should be
submitted to a Frye test. What follows is my attempt to address that
concern.
There exists a spectrum of strategies available to Florida prosecu-
tors wishing to use CSAAS. One of these is to argue for a new admissi-
bility standard. A survey of the cases reveals that the courts examining
CSAAS under the Daubert standard tend to view it in a more favorable
light.' More interesting to me was the approach of the Michigan
Supreme Court which recognized that both Frye and Daubert are
designed to test the hard, scientific-method-based sciences and thus cre-
ated a new admissibility standard for the behavioral sciences.2 An
adventurous prosecutor might ask the court to consider a similar distinc-
tion in Florida.
Happily, an innovation like this is probably unnecessary, since
CSAAS really should pass a Frye test when offered for the correct pur-
pose (rehabilitation). My paper noted that this usage has met with
"almost universal approval." 3 I am confident (as is, I think, Professor
Ehrhardt) that as prosecutors become familiar with the proper usage of
CSAAS, the Florida courts will acknowledge its utility and Florida
juries will have another tool to aid them in this most difficult of
decisions.
MICHAEL D. STANGER
1. Arthur H. Garrison, Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome: Issues of
Admissibility in Criminal Trials, 10 ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE ACCUSATIONS 10 (1998).
2. The ultimate testimony received on syndrome evidence is really only an opinion of the
expert based on collective clinical observations of a class of victims. Further, the issues and the
testimony solicited from experts is not so complicated that jurors will not be able to understand
the "technical" details. The experts in each case are merely outlining probable responses to a
traumatic event. It is clearly within the realm of all human experience to expect that a person
would react to a traumatic event and that such reactions would not be consistent or predictable in
all persons. Finally, there is a fundamental difference between techniques and procedures based
on chemical, biological, or other physical sciences as contrasted with theories and assumptions
that are based on the behavioral sciences. "We would hold that so long as the purpose of the
evidence is merely to offer an explanation for certain behavior, the Davis/Frye test is
inapplicable." People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 404 (Mich. 1990).
3. State v. J.Q., 599 A.2d 172, 183 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
